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Kant unwarrantedly downgrades the aesthetic credentials of the mathematical and 
dynamical sublime, by unduly emphasising not merely its moral significance but also, 
and especially, the moral ground of the pleasure we take in it and of the 
communicability of the aesthetic judgment based upon it. I argue that Kant is wrong 
both in grounding the sublime in morality and our susceptibility to moral ideas, and in 
grounding sublime pleasure in the awareness of our moral superiority over nature. 
On Kant’s account, I contend, despite his averments to the contrary, the judgment of 
the sublime is not purely aesthetic.1  
 
The Mathematical Sublime 
Kant distinguishes two varieties within the category of the sublime: the mathematical 
and the dynamical sublime. In keeping with the traditional 18th-century distinction 
between a sense of sublimity connected to size and one connected to power, Kant’s 
mathematical sublime is connected to what is excessively or absolutely large and 
cannot be grasped fully by our senses and imagination. The dynamical sublime is, on 
the other hand, connected to an overwhelming power (of, for instance, a hurricane or 
a volcano) which surpasses the power of imagination. Despite their differences, both 
varieties of the sublime are, according to Kant, united in putting us in touch with our 
moral powers and sensibilities and, as we shall see, the pleasure they yield is 
ultimately grounded in man’s moral superiority over nature. 
In the mathematical sublime our senses are pushed to the limits of their powers 
through the overwhelming size of natural objects or phenomena. Although Kant 
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clearly holds that ‘nature is sublime in those of its appearances whose intuition 
carries with it the idea of their infinity’, he meaningfully adds that ‘the only way for this 
to occur is through the inadequacy [nicht anders geschehen, als durch die 
Unangemessenheit] of even the greatest effort of our imagination to estimate an 
object’s magnitude.’ (§ 26, 5:255)2 On Kant’s view, the sublime is certainly not a 
transcendent experience of the absolute, and nor does it involve a (sense of) 
timelessness. Time does not stand still when faced with the sublime. We do, 
however, experience the limitations or the ‘maximum’ of the power of our senses, i.e. 
our imagination. Kant specifies this in a complex passage that is worth quoting in full: 
 
Now even though there is no maximum [Grösstes] for the mathematical 
estimation of magnitude (inasmuch as the power of numbers progresses to 
infinity), yet for the aesthetic estimation of magnitude there is indeed a 
maximum. And regarding this latter maximum I say that when it is judged as 
absolute measure beyond which no larger is subjectively possible (i.e., possible 
for the judging subject), then it carries with it the idea of the sublime and gives 
rise to that emotion which no mathematical estimation of magnitude by means 
of numbers can produce (except to the extent that the basic aesthetic measure 
is at the same time kept alive in the imagination). For a mathematical estimation 
of magnitude never exhibits more than relative magnitude, by a comparison with 
others of the same kind, whereas an aesthetic one exhibits [darstellt] absolute 





Kant argues that judging the sublime involves not a mathematical method of 
measuring, but an attempt to grasp the whole through ‘aesthetic comprehension’. 
Since there is never a first or original measure to estimate the magnitude of objects, 
however, ‘our estimation of the magnitude of the basic measure must consist merely 
in our being able to take it in directly in one intuition and to use it, by means of the 
imagination, for exhibiting numerical concepts. In other words, all estimation of the 
magnitude of objects of nature is ultimately aesthetic (i.e., determined subjectively 
rather than objectively).’ (§ 26, 5:251) The sublime is thus indeed a limit experience, 
but not in the sense that it involves a transcendent, timeless experience of the 
absolute (or of the absolutely large, or of ‘that which is large beyond any 
comparison’), but is rather a double-edged experience of the limits of sensory 
perception. It is a feeling of the ‘basic measure’ upon which all reflective judgments 
are based – the ‘horizon’, as it were, which accompanies any estimation of 
magnitudes – as well as of the limitations of imagination to comprehend the 
absolutely large, i.e. the maximum of simultaneously presentable magnitude in a 
single image. The sublime is, hence, not an experience of an absolute existing 
beyond the power of imagination (e.g. God), but of the absolute nature of the 
unsurpassable limits of our senses to comprehend large wholes in a single image. 
Our appreciation of the mathematical sublime in nature begins with aesthetically 
comparing the size of the vast object, but we are soon lost in the comparison.  
For through the failure of imagination to comprehend incomparably vast magnitudes, 
that is to say, to present them in a single image, we become aware of ‘the feeling of a 
supersensible power in us’, namely reason’s striving for totality and its urging 
imagination to come up with a measure that is suited to take in incomparably great 
wholes (§ 25, 5:250). Thus Kant argues that imagination’s failed effort reveals 
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reason’s ability to think the absolutely large as a rational idea of infinity (§ 26, 5:255). 
This felt inadequacy of imagination is, or so Kant argues, precisely what manifests 
the immense power of reason at the level of human sensibility, and makes us aware 
of the ‘higher ends’ of our rational being, i.e. our ultimate vocation, which is moral.  
Kant insists that the inadequacy of imagination to intuit infinite magnitudes is still 
pleasurable, as the judgment of the sublime is ultimately purposive for the power of 
reason and is in harmony with rational ideas.  
Surprisingly to say the least, the Kantian sublime almost loses sight altogether of the 
aesthetic object, since our admiration and astonishment for its vastness is ultimately 
due to a so-called ‘subreption’. Nature is actually mistakenly called sublime, for it is 
the mind that makes the sublimity of its own moral vocation palpable to itself. Sublime 
objects seem to be reduced to merely offering ‘occasions’ to enjoy our own 
superiority as moral subjects. No matter how deeply concerned Kant really is with 
pointing out the aesthetic nature of judgments of the sublime, and no matter how 
sophisticated his analysis, the core significance of the Kantian sublime is undeniably 
moral, since it offers ‘an expansion of the mind that feels able to cross the barriers of 
sensibility with a different (a practical) aim’, and ‘thus nature is here called sublime 
merely because it raises our imagination to the point of exhibiting those cases where 
the mind can come to feel the sublimity of its own [moral] vocation, which elevates it 
even above nature.’ (§  26, 5:255; 5:262; italics added)    
I maintain that we do not have to presuppose that the mathematical sublime is 
necessarily grounded in the awareness of the superiority of our moral vocation. To 
experience the mathematical sublime, it suffices that theoretical reason challenges 
the imagination to surpass its own limits and present to the senses what is ‘absolutely 
large’ in a single image, which it obviously fails to do and through which we 
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experience displeasure. For the pleasure in the sublime results from the peculiar 
awareness – which makes itself felt only through the displeasure of imagination’s 
inadequacy, hence, at the level of sensibility – that we, as rational beings, have the 
power to think ideas which we cannot comprehend in a single intuition.3 The conflict 
between reason and imagination would then be inextricably linked up with our 
awareness of the tremendous power of reason in its theoretical capacity, which 
keeps striving for absolute totality even if this implies perturbing or distorting sensory 
perception. The question now arises as to whether Kant is able to offer a more 
plausible account of the other variety of the experience of the sublime, namely the 
dynamical sublime. 
 
The Dynamical Sublime 
In the dynamical sublime, it is power and not just size that is overwhelming to the 
senses and imagination. Although we feel ourselves to be in safety, we are still 
overwhelmed by the might of nature. Kant writes: 
 
Bold, overhanging and, as it were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds piling up in 
the sky and moving about accompanied by lightning and thunderclaps, 
volcanoes with all their destructive power, hurricanes with all the devastation 
they leave behind, the boundless ocean heaved up, the high waterfall of a 
mighty river, and so on. Compared to the might of these, our ability to resist 
becomes an insignificant trifle. Yet the sight of them becomes all the more 
attractive the more fearful it is, provided we are in a safe place. And we like to 
call these objects sublime because they […] allow us to discover in ourselves 
an ability to resist which is of a quite different kind, and which gives us the 
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courage to believe that we could be a match for nature’s seeming omnipotence. 
(§ 28, 5:261) 
 
Kant concurs with Edmund Burke that the feeling of the dynamically sublime arises 
only ‘provided we are in a safe place’, but (contra Burke) Kant argues that the 
concomitant pleasure does not result from realising our personal safety but from 
realising that we have in us ‘an ability to resist [nature’s might] which is of quite 
different kind’. By this Kant clearly means our ability as moral persons, who are 
orientated towards suppressing sensible inclinations in order to behave morally. 
Being in a safe place enables us to judge the might of hurricanes, volcanoes, and so 
on, as sublime without undergoing real fear.  
Moreover, this type of aesthetic judgment is not merely ‘similar to the moral 
disposition’ (‘General Comment’, 5:268), it also prepares us not merely for loving 
nature, as beauty does, but ‘for esteeming it even against our interest (of sense).’ 
(‘General Comment’, 5:267) And, even more crucial to Kant’s analysis of the 
dynamical sublime, the pleasurable aspect of the sublime ‘vibration’ (Erschütterung), 
as Kant calls it, is essentially based on our susceptibility to morality, for it is a ‘feeling 
of this supersensible vocation’ that we, as rational beings, all have. ‘The violence that 
the imagination inflicts on the subject’ is experienced as pleasurable merely because 
it is ‘judged purposive for the whole vocation of the mind’, which is (in Kant’s view) 
purely moral. It even ‘reveals in us at the same time an ability to judge ourselves 
independent of nature, and reveals in us a superiority over nature’ (§ 28, 5:261). 
Although the sublime does not necessarily involve any conscious intellectual 
recognition of our moral vocation, the pleasure that we may experience, provided we 
believe ourselves to be safe, is based upon ‘discovering’ in our mind ‘a superiority 
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over nature itself in its immensity’, since ‘it reveals in us an ability to judge ourselves 
independent of nature’, which ‘keeps the humanity in our person from being 
degraded, even though a human being would have to succumb to that dominance of 
nature.’ (§ 28, 5:261; 5:262) Although Kant sometimes seems to suggest otherwise, 
the dynamical sublime arises through an activity of the imagination, is based on 
feeling and does not necessarily require any cognitive recognition of our power of 
reason.  
It is hard to see, though, how the revelation of our moral independence and 
superiority over nature can come about without any conceptual basis for our 
judgement.4 Thus not only the purported moral basis of the pleasure threatens the 
Kantian sublime’s purely aesthetic nature, but also Kant’s emphasis that the sublime 
allows us to recognise ourselves as moral beings. 
What is perhaps more perplexing than this quasi-moralisation of the sublime, and 
even more damaging to his aesthetic doctrine, is that Kant, when discussing the 
modality of the judgment of the sublime in § 29, argues that it ‘has its foundation … in 
something that, along with common sense, we may require and demand of everyone, 
namely the predisposition to the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e., to moral feeling.’ (§ 
29, 5:265; italics added) Kant emphatically claims that the sublime is founded on our 
predisposition to moral feeling, and despite his attempt to safeguard the sublime’s 
aesthetic credentials, this definitely affects the purely aesthetic nature of the 
judgment of the sublime.5 It is obviously right that the sublime may have a 
propaedeutic function with regard to morality, and that this does not necessarily turn 
the sublime into moral feeling.6 The Kantian sublime is indeed merely akin to moral 
respect, since it does not suppress our sensible inclinations (Neigungen) but rather 
violates as well as expands our imagination, offering us a mixed feeling of pleasure 
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and displeasure which is analogous (and, hence, not identical) to the struggle with 
sensible inclinations involved in behaving morally.7  
However, what most commentators seem to have overlooked but actually proves far 
more damaging to the purely aesthetic nature of the judgment of the sublime, is that 
one of the vital a priori requirements of pure aesthetic judgment, namely its 
necessary universal communicability (sometimes inappropriately called, its 
intersubjective nature) cannot be met by the judgment concerning the sublime, 
unless it is grounded in morality.8  
 
The Impurity of the Sublime 
What has often been downplayed in the literature, but seems to me to be one of the 
determining aspects of the Kantian sublime, is that, compared to judgments of natural 
beauty, ‘we cannot with the same readiness count on others to accept our judgment 
about the sublime in nature’. (§ 29, 5:264) This has a number of reasons, three of 
which are especially worth emphasising.  
First, unlike beauty, the sublime does not provide an ‘attunement [Stimmung] of the 
cognitive powers that is required for cognition in general’ and ‘without which cognition 
[…] could not arise’ (§ 21, 5:238; see also §39, 5:293). This ‘attunement’ purportedly 
grounds the judgment of beauty’s universal validity, and since it fails to occur in the 
sublime, which does not offer a harmonious play between imagination and 
understanding but a turbulent struggle between imagination and reason, the sublime 
cannot ‘with the same readiness’ demand to be universally shared. (We shall shortly 
see why this is the case exactly and also why this severely damages the sublime’s 
purely aesthetic status.)  
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Second, to be able to judge vast or mighty natural objects as sublime one needs 
culture – or, at least, more culture is required compared to what is needed to 
appreciate natural beauty (see § 29, 5:265). One must be receptive to rational ideas, 
in order to become properly attuned, as Kant puts it, to the feeling of the sublime. 
Thus, instead of urging that the sublime merely prepares us for morality, Kant in fact 
argues that people who have not been sufficiently ‘prepared’ by culture to appreciate 
the sublimity of overwhelming nature will simply be frightened and repelled by such 
overwhelming natural phenomena: they will not be able to take pleasure in what is 
violent, overwhelming and potentially destructive to them. Only if one is sufficiently 
susceptible to rational ideas can one judge mighty objects as sublime, that is to say, 
as not merely chaotic, harmful, dangerous and frightening, but also as ultimately 
purposive. It should be clear from the above passage that it is, again, reason (and 
not understanding, as in the beautiful) that grounds the feeling of the sublime. 
Reason actually uses – or rather abuses – imagination so as to confront nature’s 
destructive powers in order to reveal its own superior might. The sublime is indeed ‘a 
pleasure involved in reasoning contemplation (Lust der vernünftelnden 
Kontemplation)’ (§ 39, 5:292). 
Thirdly, the modality of the judgment of sublimity is, as Kant says, ‘one principal 
moment for a critique of judgment’ (§ 29, 5:266), but it has received surprisingly little 
attention from most commentators.9 Its importance can hardly be overlooked, 
however, for it is supposed to convince us of the thought that, as Brady contends, 
despite ‘important differences between the sublime and the beautiful, these 
differences do not undermine a case for the sublime as aesthetic.’10 I concur with 
Brady that questioning the aesthetic status of the Kantian sublime simply by referring 
to its intimate links to our moral disposition and the moral feeling of respect, may not 
10 
 
be altogether convincing. For whilst it is true that the sublime may somehow prepare 
us for treating nature with admiration and persons with respect, that in itself is no 
reason to question the sublime’s aesthetic nature. For pure beauty, too, prepares us 
to love nature and even symbolises morality, yet this does not therefore turn the 
feeling of the beautiful into a moral feeling. On the contrary, this might actually work 
in the opposite direction. It is only because beauty exclusively belongs to the 
aesthetic domain that it may enhance moral capacities and teleological 
understanding, and be a sign of a genuinely moral disposition. Moreover, that Kant 
attends to the formless character of sublime objects might further support its 
aesthetic character, as e.g. Brady, Gibbons and Makkreel contend.11 Judging the 
sublime is clearly connected to peculiar features of ‘raw nature’, which engage 
imagination and ‘expand it commensurately’ with reason’s power, through which it 
‘acquires an expansion and a power that surpasses the one it sacrifices’. (§ 25, 
5:249; ‘General Comment’, 5:274; 5:269; see also § 28, 5:262)  
Yet, even though (as I aimed to show elsewhere12) Kant’s doctrine of the sublime can 
be upgraded to a genuinely aesthetic exploration of the sublime (in art) and offer a 
more positive evaluation of imagination’s productive activity and presentational 
powers, at least one striking and, to my mind, insurmountable difficulty remains. For, 
whilst on Kant’s official view, judgments of beauty and sublimity share the general 
characteristics of aesthetic judgments – they please without necessary reference to 
concepts, they claim universal validity, they are subjectively purposive, and they are 
subjectively necessary; however, unlike judgments of beauty, judgments about the 
sublime cannot immediately demand universal assent, unless quite a ‘detour’ is 
made, namely via practical reason. What Kant does not sufficiently emphasise is that, 
despite all that beauty and sublimity have in common, the modality of the two 
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judgments is far for similar – and this severely tarnishes the sublime’s aesthetic 
credentials.  
What are, then, the most striking differences with regard to their modality? First, Kant 
argues that the sublime requires more culture, i.e. ‘Kultur’ in the sense of the 
development of moral ideas, than the beautiful (§ 29, 5:265). This is of the utmost 
importance. For, according to Kant, the beautiful testifies to a felt harmony not only 
between imagination and understanding but also between the mind (Gemüt) and the 
purposive forms of nature, which tightly connects beauty to natural teleology. The 
feeling of the sublime, on the other hand, by no means presupposes nor engenders 
such a harmonious continuity between our mind and nature. In the sublime, Kant 
contends, reason is felt to be triumphant over nature, for ‘we judge the sensible in the 
presentation of nature to be suitable for a possible supersensible use’ (§ 27, 5:258). 
Furthermore, the sublime can ‘present […] imagination and reason as harmonious by 
virtue of their contrast’ and give rise to a purposiveness by the very conflict of 
imagination and reason (ibid.). The overwhelming object is excessive for the 
imagination, ‘against our interest of sense’ and even ‘repulsive to mere sensibility’, 
and pleasure can arise solely because reason uses nature to force imagination to 
surpass its limits in order to make palpable the moral vocation of the mind, which is 
infinitely superior over nature (see ‘General Comment’, 5:267). 
Second, whilst the exemplary necessity of the judgment of beauty is based on the 
free yet harmonious play of our cognitive powers which is purportedly conducive to 
any type of cognitive operation, the pleasure accompanying the judgment of the 
sublime cannot be immediately shared by all, as the sublime is not a matter of taste, 
says Kant, but of feeling. Importantly, the pleasure in the sublime is ‘a pleasure 
involved in reasoning contemplation’ (§ 39, 5:292; italics added). Its demand that 
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everyone approve refers to ‘subjective bases as they are purposive’ not for ‘the 
benefit of the contemplative understanding’, as with the beautiful, but merely ‘in 
relation to moral feeling’ (‘General Comment’, 5:267). Kant even insists that ‘what is 
sublime, in the proper meaning of the term, cannot be contained in any sensible form 
but concerns only ideas of reason […] Thus the vast ocean heaved up by storms 
cannot be sublime. The sight of it is horrible’ (§ 23, 5:245). I concur with 
commentators such as Malcolm Budd and Katie McShane, who interpret Kant’s 
theory correctly as overly directed at the sublimity of the (moral) subject and with 
Ronald Hepburn, who justly argues that Kant’s doctrine downgrades ‘nature’s 
contribution in favour of the one-sided exalting of the rational subject’.13  
Also, someone lacks feeling, not taste, Kant contends, ‘if he remains unmoved in the 
presence of something we judge sublime.’ (§ 29, 5:265) Therefore, and this is an 
extremely important point, contrary to judgments of beauty, the sublime cannot 
demand immediate communication (unmittelbare Teilnehmung). The principal reason 
for this is that, whereas assenting to judgments of taste can be ‘demanded 
unhesitatingly from everyone’: 
 
In the case of feeling, on the other hand, judgment refers the imagination to 
reason, our power of ideas, and so we demand feeling only under a subjective 
presupposition (though we believe we are justified and permitted to require 
fulfilment of this presupposition in everyone): we presuppose moral feeling in 
man. And so we attribute necessity to this kind of aesthetic judgment as well. (§ 




From this follows that, despite all similarities between judgments of beauty and 
sublimity which Kant is keen to point out, there is an immense difference between the 
ways they are able to meet the modal requirement of pure aesthetic judgments, i.e. 
the crucial a priori requirement to be universally communicated or shared. Pace 
Brady and numerous other commentators, I do not think this is a minor point which 
leaves the sublime squarely in purely aesthetic territory. On the contrary, it deeply 
affects the purely aesthetic character of the Kantian sublime. For the requirement of 
universal assent is one of the transcendental conditions that is supposed to logically 
distinguish aesthetic from non-aesthetic judgments. It forms the very heart of Kant’s 
critique of aesthetic judgment. 
Furthermore, whereas the beautiful lays claim to immediate participation 
(Teilnehmung) and universal assent, the sublime demands universal participation, 
merely because it ‘presupposes […] a feeling of our supersensible vocation, a feeling 
which, however obscure it may be, has a moral foundation’ (§ 39, 5:292). And as the 
sublime reveals the presence of moral freedom and thus endows us with a value 
infinitely superior to nature, its demand to be universally shared can be based solely 
on the transcendental idea of moral freedom. Kant expressly specifies this in section 
39, which has been usually downplayed by commentators, possibly because it does 
not feature in the Analytic of the Sublime as such. Yet what Kant writes, is crucial and 
unambiguous: ‘I may require that liking too from everyone, but only by means of the 
moral law, which is in turn based on concepts of reason.’ (§ 39, 5:292) What 
demands and legitimates the necessity of the sublime’s universal shareability is 
neither cognitive nor aesthetic, but moral. 
Does this, then, turn the feeling of the sublime into moral feeling? By no means, for 
the feeling of respect is not aesthetically pleasurable (it is definitely not 
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‘Wohlgefallen’). Furthermore, as already indicated, in the sublime ‘the imagination 
thereby acquires an expansion and a power that surpasses the one it sacrifices’, 
which is (although clearly grounded in practical reason’s impossible demand to 
present what cannot be presented) obviously a matter of aesthetic presentation 
(Darstellung), which cannot be confused with moral action and the feeling of respect. 
(‘General Comment’, 5:269; see also § 25, 5:249) 
However, as already noted, the story of the Kantian sublime does not end here. The 
Kantian sublime is not merely analogous to moral struggle. For Kant is adamant that 
what grounds not only the universal communicability of the sublime but also the 
pleasure we take in it – hence, what supposedly resolves ‘the paradox of the sublime’ 
– is really the ‘non-pathological’ feeling of moral respect. Thus, the feeling of the 
sublime is not itself a moral feeling, but both its requirement to be universally shared, 
which is supposed to guarantee its purely aesthetic credentials, and its pleasurable 
aspect do presuppose the ability to take pure interest in the moral law. Hence, 
contrary to pure judgments of beauty, judgments about the sublime cannot be 
immediately shared, as their demand to be assented to by all others purportedly 
needs to be mediated by morality.  
This clearly tarnishes the sublime’s purely aesthetic character. For, as Kant writes, 
‘from the aesthetic side […], the pleasure is negative, i.e. opposed to this interest, but 
considered from the intellectual side it is positive and connected with an interest.’ 
(‘General Comment’, 5:271) No matter how hard Kant and several of his sympathetic 
commentators attempt to safeguard the sublime’s purely aesthetic nature, one ought 
to concede that the demand of the sublime for universal assent stems solely from ‘the 
intellectual side’ of the feeling, i.e. the universal validity of the moral law, which is 
intimately tied up with the palpable presence of the Idea of moral freedom in the 
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mind.14 There can thus be neither a completely disinterested judgment of the sublime 
nor a sublime ‘sensus communis’. It is necessarily an impure or ‘dependent’ 
judgment.15 This might also ultimately explain the healthy ‘madness (Wahnsinn)’ 
which is typical of sublime affects, such as enthusiasm (‘General Comment’, 5:275).16   
Sublime ‘vibration’ (Erschütterung), as Kant calls it in § 27, cannot be purely 
aesthetic, as it really belongs to two separate realms or territories, the moral and the 
aesthetic – or, rather, to neither of them as such. The sublime indeed simultaneously 
involves ‘repulsion and attraction’. The Kantian sublime is, like a monster in a horror 
film, interstitial. 17 It is a radically split feeling dwelling in two distinct domains, and is 




                                               
1 Arthur Schopenhauer offers a more plausible theory of the sublime, which safeguards the sublime’s 
aesthetic credentials and moves beyond Kant’s in numerous meaningful ways, as I argue extensively 
in my book The Sublime in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
There I offer a profound critique of Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s doctrines. Drawing on recent insights in 
philosophy of mind and psychology, I also offer a critical alternative to Schopenhauer’s theory of the 
sublime. 
2 References to Kant are to his Kritik der Urteilskraft. I indicate the section number, followed by the 
‘Akademie Ausgabe’ volume and pagination. Translations are based upon Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
Judgment, Translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) and Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, Edited by Paul Guyer, Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: 




3 ‘Intuition’ is often used to mean ‘ineffable insight’, and the sublime has frequently been associated 
with this kind of (quasi-)mystical understanding. I here use ‘intuition’ in the Kantian sense of an 
imaginative synthesis of the manifold’s appearance. 
4 Here I take issue with Emily Brady’s all too charitable, ‘aesthetic’ reading of the Kantian sublime. See 
Brady, The Sublime in Modern Philosophy: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 189 and passim. 
5 See Brady, The Sublime in Modern Philosophy, 61: ‘My reading of Kant’s sublime places it firmly 
within the aesthetic domain. While there are key links made to practical reason, the foundation of 
Kantian morality, it is important to emphasize that this type of judgment, like the beautiful, only 
prepares us for morality’. This is misguided, since for Kant the modality of the sublime, i.e., its demand 
to be universally shared, ‘has its foundation in human nature: in something that […] we may require 
and demand of everyone, namely, the predisposition to the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e., to moral 
feeling’. Therefore, someone who cannot appreciate the sublime in nature is ‘someone who has no 
feeling’. (§ 29, 265) Hence the sublime does not merely prepare us for morality, but is actually based 
upon our predisposition to moral feeling. Moreover, its claim to universal communicability is construed 
as grounded in the (unwarranted) assumption of a susceptibility to moral ideas in all human beings. It 
might be no coincidence that Kant usually puts ‘practical’ between brackets in § 29, as he often does 
in the context of the sublime. Perhaps he sensed the threat that such a close link to morality would 
pose to the purely aesthetic nature of the sublime. But unfortunately Kant could not resist, what 
Malcolm Budd aptly calls, ‘his inveterate tendency to evaluate everything by reference to moral value’. 
See Malcolm Budd, ‘The Sublime in Nature’, in Paul Guyer, ed., Kant’s Critique of the Power of 
Judgment (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 134 and Malcolm Budd, The Aesthetic Appreciation 
of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 68 and 84. My view is that Budd is right and that 
Brady’s reading is overly charitable.  
6 Here I disagree with Melissa McBay Merritt, who holds that ‘moral feeling is a mode of the Kantian 
sublime: it is an elevated state of mind, registering as the subject’s attraction to an ideal conceived 
through the moral law.’ See Melissa Merritt, ‘The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime’, in Timothy M. 
Costelloe, ed., The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 




pathological’ feeling. Kant does say at one point that ‘the liking for the sublime contains not so much 
positive pleasure as rather admiration and respect, and so should be called a negative pleasure.’ (§ 
23, 5:245) From this does not follow, however, that Kant implies that the moral feeling of respect is 
identical to the feeling of the sublime, and it would be rather odd if he did. He even explicitly 
acknowledges that ‘the moral law in its might’ is ‘the object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual 
liking’ and, hence, not aesthetically sublime itself. It is only ‘if we judge aesthetically […] the moral 
good, [that] we must present it not so much as beautiful but rather as sublime, so that it will arouse a 
feeling of respect’ (‘General Comment’, 5:271; italics added). Kant thus holds that moral feeling is 
analogous to the sublime, not that it is identical with it, and that the sublime may give rise to a feeling 
of respect. 
7 Katerina Deligiorgi even argues that sublime pleasure ‘comes from the mere thought that we have 
the capacity for agency’. See Katerina Deligiorgi, ‘The Pleasures of Contra-Purposiveness: Kant, the 
Sublime, and Being Human’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72, 2014, 32.  
8 Already in the pre-critical Observations, Kant draws a connection between the sublime and morality. 
See also Clewis, The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom, 13. Still, the connection 
between sublimity and morality is much tighter in his critical work.   
9 One notable exception is Jean-François Lyotard. See Jean-François Lyotard, Lessons on the 
Analytic of the Sublime (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 224-239. 
10 See Brady, The Sublime in Modern Philosophy, 74. 
11 See Brady, The Sublime in Modern Philosophy, 74-79; Sarah Gibbons, Kant’s Theory of 
Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgment and Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 136, 148ff., 
150-151, and passim; and Rudolf Makkreel, Imagination and Understanding in Kant (Chicago: 
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